Timothy S. Tarver and Carole A. Tarver v. City of Sheridan Board of Adjustments, Robert L. Bernard and Beverly D. Bernard :: Wyoming Supreme Court :: State Civil Lawsuit No. S-13-0171 (2024)

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 71APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014June 5, 2014

TIMOTHY S. TARVER and CAROLE A.TARVER,Appellants(Petitioners),v.

S-13-0171

CITY OF SHERIDAN BOARD OFADJUSTMENTS, ROBERT L. BERNARDand BEVERLY D. BERNARD,Appellees(Respondents).

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan CountyThe Honorable William J. Edelman, Judge

Representing Appellants:Timothy S. Tarver, Sheridan, Wyoming.Representing Appellee City of Sheridan Board of Adjustments:Kevin K. Kessner, Sheridan, Wyoming. No appearance.Representing Appellees Robert L. Bernard and Beverly D. Bernard:Christopher M. Wages of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, BURKE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be madebefore final publication in the permanent volume.KITE, Chief Justice.[¶1] Timothy S. and Carole A. Tarver appeal from the district court's order affirmingthe City of Sheridan Board of Adjustments? (Board) 1 approval of Robert L. and BeverlyD. Bernards? request for a special exemption to operate a bed and breakfast in an areazoned residential. The Tarvers claim the Bernards? application was barred by resjudicata, the Board was without authority to impose parking restrictions on the bed andbreakfast, and the bed and breakfast did not meet the requirements for a specialexemption to the zoning ordinances.[¶2] We conclude the Bernards were not barred from filing a second application for a special exemption, the Board acted within its authority when it conditioned the specialexemption and its decision allowing the special exemption with parking conditions is supported by the record. We, therefore, affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3] The salient issues presented in this case are:1. Was the Bernards? second application for a special exemption barred by resjudicata or collateral estoppel?2. Did the Board act in excess of its authority by requiring parking restrictionsfor the Bernards? bed and breakfast?3. Was the Board's decision that the Bernards were entitled to a specialexemption for their bed and breakfast supported by substantial evidence and inaccordance with the law?2

FACTS

1The City of Sheridan did not appear in this appeal.2 The Bernards claim they are entitled to dismissal of the Tarvers? appeal or a summary affirmance of thedistrict court's order because the Tarvers violated W.R.A.P. 7.01 by failing to attach a copy of the districtcourt's decision to their opening brief. Rule 7.01(j) requires the appellant to attach to the opening brief anappendix with copies of the final judgment or order appealed. In an administrative case, the appellantappeals the district court's ruling, but we review the agency's order. See Vogt v. State ex rel. Dept. ofTransp., 2013 WY 123, ¶ 12, 310 P.3d 899, 904 (Wyo. 2013). Thus, it is generally appropriate to attachboth of those documents. W.R.A.P. 1.03 gives this Court discretion to sanction any non-jurisdictionalerror in a brief as we deem appropriate. In this case, the Tarvers? failure to attach a copy of the districtcourt's decision does not create an undue burden, and we decline the Bernards? request to dismiss theappeal or summarily affirm the district court's decision.[End Page 1][¶4] The procedural history of this case is complex. On March 24, 2011, the Bernardsfiled their first application for a special exemption to operate a bed and breakfast in anarea of Sheridan, Wyoming which was zoned as an R-1 Residence District. As part ofthe application process, they were required to give notice to neighbors within 300 feet ofthe boundary of their property. The Tarvers live within the notification area and objectedto the Bernards? application on several bases, including increased traffic and parkingissues.[¶5] The Board held a hearing on April 14, 2011,3 and approved the Bernards?application with several conditions, one being the Bernards had to submit an off-streetparking plan that met the approval of city staff prior to operation of the bed and breakfast.The Tarvers filed a petition for review with the district court. While the appeal waspending, the Bernards worked with the city staff to secure approval of their parking plan.After engaging an attorney and an engineer, the Bernards finally obtained the city staff?sapproval of their parking plan on December 16, 2011.[¶6] On January 13, 2012, the district court reversed the Board's approval of theBernards? special exemption application, finding the Board had not followed the properprocedures in considering and granting the special exemption. The Bernards did notappeal the district court's decision.[¶7] The Bernards filed a second application for a special exemption on January 25,2012, and included the recently approved parking plan and a certificate of occupancyconfirming the bed and breakfast complied with all code requirements. The Tarversagain objected, claiming the Bernards? second application was barred by res judicata and,even if it was not barred, the application should be denied because of the deleteriouseffect of a bed and breakfast on the neighborhood.3 Although the Tarvers maintain the hearing on the Bernards? first application was a contested case, it isnot clear from the record whether that hearing was a public hearing or a contested case hearing. See ourdiscussion of the differences between the types of administrative hearings in Northern Laramie RangeFoundation v. Converse County Bd. of County Comm?rs, 2012 WY 158, ¶¶ 10-20, 290 P.3d 1063, 1070-73 (Wyo. 2012). See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-606 (indicating that boards of adjustment take action at?board meetings?); Gilbert v. Bd. of County Comm?rs of Park County, 2010 WY 68, 232 P.3d 17 (Wyo.2010); Donaghy v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Green River, 2002 WY 150, 55 P.3d 707 (Wyo. 2002);Ebzery v. City of Sheridan, 982 P.2d 1251 (Wyo. 1999); Juroszek v. City of Sheridan Bd. of Adjustment,948 P.2d 1370 (Wyo. 1997); and Cook v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181(Wyo. 1989) for examples of different types of hearings on zoning matters.The Board held another hearing on the Bernards? first application on August 11, 2011, afterwhich it issued more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its decision on the Tarvers?petition for review of the Board's decision on the Bernards? first application, the district court ruled thatthe Board did not have the authority to reconsider the April decision at the August hearing. See alsoRosenberger v. City of Casper Bd. of Adjustment, 765 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988) (discussing board?sauthority to rehear decision granting conditional use permit). In any event, the hearing on the Bernards? second application, which is the subject of this appeal, was clearly a contested case hearing.[End Page 2][¶8] The Board engaged a hearing officer to conduct a contested case hearing on thematter. The hearing officer apparently determined that the Bernards? application was notbarred by res judicata,4 and after a contested case hearing, the Board granted theBernards? application on the condition that they record restrictive covenantsincorporating the approved parking plan. The Tarvers filed another petition for reviewwith the district court. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, and the Tarversfiled a timely notice of appeal with this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW[¶9] Our review of the Board's decision granting the Bernards a special exemption foroperation of their bed and breakfast is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(LexisNexis 2013):(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and whenpresented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevantquestions of law, interpret constitutional and statutoryprovisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of theterms of an agency action. In making the followingdeterminations, the court shall review the whole record orthose parts of it cited by a party and due account shall betaken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing courtshall:(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld orunreasonably delayed; and(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings andconclusions found to be:(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion orotherwise not in accordance with law;(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege orimmunity;(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority orlimitations or lacking statutory right;4 The record does not contain an order denying the Tarvers? motion to dismiss on the basis of resjudicata; however, the circ*mstances indicate their motion was denied.[End Page 3](D) Without observance of procedure required by law;or(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a casereviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided bystatute.Specific aspects of the standard of review will be set out in the discussion of the issues,below.DISCUSSIONA. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel[¶10] The application of preclusion doctrines such as res judicata and/or collateralestoppel involves questions of law. Goodman v. Voss, 2011 WY 33, ¶ 23, 248 P.3d 1120,1127 (Wyo. 2011). We review an agency's conclusions of law de novo and affirm only ifthe agency's conclusions are in accordance with the law. Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo.Workers? Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010); Dale v. S& S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008).[¶11] In general, preclusion concepts apply to land use and zoning decisions. 101AC.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 279 (2014). See also Hilltop Terrace Homeowner?sAss?n v. Island County, 891 P.2d 29, 35 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Joelson v. City ofCasper, 676 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1984). Res judicata bars litigation of previously litigatedclaims or causes of action; collateral estoppel prohibits re-litigation of formerly litigatedissues. Given the limited authority of governmental agencies, collateral estoppel is oftenmore appropriate for application in the administrative context. Tenorio v. State ex rel.Wyo. Workers? Comp. Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997).[¶12] The factors considered in applying collateral estoppel include:(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication wasidentical with the issue presented in the present action; (2)whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on themerits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppelis asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prioradjudication; and (4) whether the party against whomcollateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunityto litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.Kahrs v. Bd. of Trustees for Platte County School Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo.1995), quoting Slavens v. Bd. of County Comm?rs for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 686[End Page 4](Wyo. 1993) (emphasis in original). The factors for application of res judicata are similar:Four factors are examined to determine whether the doctrineof res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; (2) identity insubject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to thesubject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons areidentical in reference to both the subject matter and the issuesbetween them.Wyodak Resources Dev. Corp. v. Wyo. Dept. of Revenue, 2002 WY 181, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d129, 135 (Wyo. 2002), quoting Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 15,25 P.3d 511, 517 (Wyo. 2001) (citation omitted). The two doctrines differ in that resjudicata bars claims that could have been brought in the first action even if they were not.Stoneking v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass?n, 2003 WY 81, ¶ 11, 72 P.3d 272, 275-76(Wyo. 2003).[¶13] Although the decision of a zoning authority will generally be considered final andidentical subsequent applications are barred under principles of res judicata and/orcollateral estoppel, ?res judicata will not prevent the approval of a second applicationwhere the second application presents substantial changes from the first application.?101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 279. See also Hilltop Terrace, 891 P.2d at 35; Inre Woodstock Community Trust & Housing Vermont PRD, 60 A.3d 686, 692 (Vt. 2012).Under those circ*mstances, the issues or subject matters presented in the twoadministrative actions are not identical.[¶14] In the case at bar, the Board approved the first application, but its decision wasreversed by the district court because the agency failed to comply with its own rules andprocedures. The general issues in the two administrative actions were the same, i.e.,applications seeking approval of a special exemption for operation of a bed and breakfastin a residential area. However, the second application differed from the first because itincluded an approved parking plan and a certificate of occupancy.[¶15] In addition, the district court's reversal of the Board's decision on the Bernards?first application clearly was not a final judgment on the merits. The district courtexplained its initial decision as follows:[End Page 22. The City of Sheridan Code governing the Board]provides that the Board has the authority ?[t]o hear anddecide special exemptions to the terms of this ordinance uponwhich the board is required to pass.? Sheridan MunicipalCode, Appendix A § 14.2. The city code further provides that[End Page 5][i]n granting special exemptions, the board shall findthe following:(a) The exemption requested is listed as an allowed special exemption within the zoning district in which theproperty is located.(b) The use is consistent with the goals, policies,and recommended future land use of the adopted master plan.(c) The granting of the exemption is in harmonywith the general purposes and intent of the ordinance and willnot be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimentalto the public welfare.23. The Board failed to make two of the threefindings required by the Sheridan Municipal Code when itissued its order granting the Bernards? exemption application.According to the meeting minutes, Mr. Tarver addressed thethree findings that were required by the city code at thehearing. Mr. Tarver indicated that he believed the firstfinding, that the exemption was an allowed exemption withinits zoning district, had been met; however, Mr. Tarver alsoindicated that the second two findings needed to be addressedby the Board. Despite that, the record only reflects that theBoard made one of the required findings.24. The record before the Court is extremelylimited. The parties provided to the Court, and stipulated tothe accuracy of, the minutes from the April 14, 2011 hearing;however, no verbatim record of the hearing was provided.Based on the limited record that is before the Court, there isno evidence that the Board made all three findings mandatedby § 14.2. The Board did find, as required under § 14.2(a),that the exemption requested was a special exemptionallowed under the code. Thereafter, however, the Board simply found that ?granting the special exemption is notcontrary to the public interest, and is in harmony with the spirit of the zoning ordinance, as long as the property ownercomplies with other aspects of the zoning ordinance.? Onecould only assume that finding was intended as a convenient shorthand for the proposition that ?[t]he use is consistent withthe goals, policies, and recommended future land use of the[End Page 6]adopted master plan? (the finding required by § 14.2(b)) andthat ?[t]he granting of the exemption is in harmony with thegeneral purposes and intent of the ordinance and will not beinjurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to thepublic welfare? (the finding required by § 14.2(c)). . . . TheBoard's finding falls short of the explicit requirements of thecode. From the record before the Court, it is apparent that theBoard failed to comply with the procedures required by theSheridan Municipal Code because the Board failed to makethe findings set forth in § 14.2 (b) and (c). Accordingly, theBoard's decision cannot be upheld. [footnote 2][footnote 2 stated]: The Court further notes that given thelimited record before the Court (including no verbatim recordof the hearing, brief meeting minutes, and no other findingsof fact or conclusions of law from the Board in support of itsdecision), there is no substantial evidence to support the threefindings required by the municipal code. Because the Courtconcluded that the Board failed to comply with theprocedures required by law, the court does not need toundertake a ?substantial evidence? analysis, except to notethat the lack of support in the record for the § 14.2 findings isa sufficient and independent ground for reversal.....[End Page 27. [T]he Board failed to follow its own procedure]by failing to make the findings required by the SheridanMunicipal Code. Thus, the Board's decision is reversibleunder W.S. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(D) for failing to follow theprocedures prescribed by law. Furthermore, given the scantrecord before the Court, there is no substantial evidence in therecord to support the Board's findings that the specialexemption application should be granted. If a newapplication for a special exemption were filed, it should beclear from the record for future review that required findingsare made and substantiated.[¶16] The district court's decision was clearly based upon the Board's failure tofollow the proper procedures and analyze the relevant legal questions. As such,the district court did not reach a final decision on the merits. The Tarvers argue,nonetheless, that the district court's mention of a lack of substantial evidence inthe record finally decided the matter. The district court mentioned the inadequacyof the factual evidence in the record, but its focus was on the lack of record[End Page 7]altogether, rather than the lack of evidence within a sufficient record.[¶17] It is also clear the district court did not consider its decision in that first appeal tobe a final decision on the merits. In Paragraph 27 of its decision, it specificallymentioned the possibility of another application being filed and directed how the Board should analyze it if that occurred. Considering the Tarvers? argument that the Bernardswere barred from bringing a second application by the earlier ruling, the district court stated:The Court finds that res judicata is not applicable inthe present case. The Court finds that due to the Board?sfailure to follow its own rules and procedures during the firstapplication process, the matter was not fully and fairlylitigated in that proceeding. Penalizing an applicant for anagency's failure to adhere to its own rules and procedureswould be patently unfair, and, the ends of justice require thatthe Bernards be allowed to reapply and have their applicationbe administered in the proper manner.[¶18] We agree with both of the district court's observations. The requisite issue wasnot fully and fairly litigated and there was no final decision on the merits of the firstapplication. It would also be unfair to apply a preclusion doctrine against the Bernardsunder the circ*mstances of this case because the agency erred in applying its own rulesand procedures. We have stated that one of the goals of res judicata is to ?give, ratherthan deny, justice.? Eklund v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2004 WY 24, ¶ 22, 86 P.3d 259,265 (Wyo. 2004); Cermak v. Great West Cas. Co., 2 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Wyo. 2000). TheBernards? second application for a special exemption was not barred by res judicata orcollateral estoppel.B. The Board's Authority to Condition a Special Exemption[¶19] The Tarvers maintain that the Board did not have authority to impose any type ofparking restrictions on a property zoned R-1 Residence. This seems like a strangeargument for them to make, considering one of their objections to the bed and breakfastwas parking. However, their argument makes sense when considered in context. TheTarvers assert the city staff concluded that allowing the bed and breakfast withoutparking restrictions would be injurious to the neighborhood and R-1 zoning does notallow any parking restrictions for existing structures. Thus, they argue, the Board waswithout authority to impose parking restrictions and, without the restrictions, theBernards could not meet the requirements for a special exemption.[¶20] As we noted in the standard of review section, above, an agency's decision will beheld unlawful and set aside if it is ?[i]n excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or[End Page 8]limitations or lacking statutory right.? Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C). See also Horse CreekConservation Dist v. State ex rel. Wyo. Attorney General, 2009 WY 143, ¶ 30, 221 P.3d306, 316 (Wyo. 2009) (agencies can exercise only those powers authorized by statute).Interpretation of statutes, administrative regulations and municipal ordinances is a matterof law, which we review de novo. J & T Properties, LLC v. Gallagher, 2011 WY 112,256 P.3d 522 (Wyo. 2011) (statutes); Laramie County Sheriff's Dept. v. Cook, 2012 WY47, 272 P.3d 966 (Wyo. 2012) (administrative regulations); Snake River Brewing Co. v.Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, 39 P.3d 397 (Wyo. 2002) (municipal ordinances). Tointerpret statutory language:[T]he paramount consideration is to determine thelegislature's intent, which must be ascertained initiallyand primarily from the words used in the statute. We lookfirst to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words todetermine if the statute is ambiguous. A statute is clearand unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonablepersons are able to agree on its meaning with consistencyand predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if itis found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varyinginterpretations. If we determine that a statute is clear andunambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of thestatute.Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d549, 552 (Wyo.2010) (citation omitted).Office of State Lands & Investments v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 2011 WY 68, ¶ 13, 252P.3d 951, 954-55 (Wyo. 2011). All statutory provisions pertaining to the same subjectare considered in pari materia. Sorensen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 WY 101, ¶13, 234 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 2010).[¶21] Wyoming statutes give the governing body of any city or town the right to regulateland use. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-601 (LexisNexis 2013) states:(a) The governing body of any city or town, by ordinance,may:(i) Regulate and restrict the:(A) Height, number of stories and size of buildings andother structures;(B) Percentage of lot that may be occupied;(C) Size of yards, courts and other open spaces;(D) Density of population; and(E) Location and use of buildings, structures and land[End Page 9]for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.(ii) Establish setback building lines.(b) The governing body may divide the city or town intodistricts of such number, shape and area as it deemsnecessary, and within those districts it may regulate andrestrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration,repair or use of buildings, structures or land.(c) Regulations may differ from one (1) district to another butshall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings within adistrict.(d) All regulations shall be made:(i) In accordance with a comprehensive plan anddesigned to:(A) Lessen congestion in the streets;(B) Secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers;(C) Promote health and general welfare;(D) Provide adequate light and air;(E) Prevent the overcrowding of land;(F) Avoid undue concentration of population; and(G) Facilitate adequate provisions for transportation,water, sewerage, schools, parks and other publicrequirements.(ii) With reasonable consideration, among other things,of the character of the district and its peculiar suitability forparticular uses;(iii) With a view to conserving the value of buildingsand encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughoutthe city or town; and(iv) With consideration given to the historic integrityof certain neighborhoods or districts and a view to preserving,rehabilitating and maintaining historic properties andencouraging compatible uses within the neighborhoods ordistricts, but no regulation made to carry out the purposes ofthis paragraph is valid to the extent it constitutes anunconstitutional taking without compensation.[¶22] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-605 (LexisNexis 2013) directs the mayor, with the consentof the governing body, to appoint a board of adjustment to govern land use decisions.For our purposes, the board of adjustment has the statutory power to ?[h]ear and decide special exemptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which the board is required to pass[End Page 10]under the ordinance[.]? Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-608(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2013). Seegenerally State of Wyo. ex rel. Epp v. Mayor of Dubois, 894 P.2d 590, 596 (Wyo. 1995)(emphasizing the discretionary power of the board of adjustment in considering specialexemption requests).[¶23] Consistent with its statutory authority, the Sheridan City Council adopted zoningordinances, appointed the Board, and adopted procedures for special exemptions.Sheridan Zoning Ord. § 4.1 pertains to the R-1 Residence District, within which theBernard and Tarver properties are located:[End Page 4.1 R-1 Residence District.]A. Use Regulations. The following uses shall bepermitted:[End Page 1. One-family dwelling.]building.[End Page 4. Public and private school, elementary and high,]college.[End Page 5. Church or other place of worship. Parish house.]except for such uses as warehouse, garage or other usescustomarily carried on as a business.[End Page 7. Water supply reservoir, well, tower or filter bed.]office and no repair or storage facilities are maintained.[End Page 9. Railway right of way not including railway]yards. Passenger station.[End Page 10. Agriculture, gardening, and nursing for the]propagation of plants.[End Page 11. Home occupations as defined herein.]incidental to any of the above uses.[¶24] Subsections B. and C. of § 4.1 set out height and area regulations for the R-1Residence District. Subsection D. delineates the permissible special exemptions:D. Special Exemptions allowed within an R-1 ResidenceDistrict:[End Page 1. Bed and breakfast.][End Page 11]animal hospitals.[End Page 4. Home for the children or aged.][¶25] The Board considers applications for special exemptions to the zoning ordinancesunder Sheridan Zoning Ord. ¶ 14.2, which states in relevant part:[End Page 2 . . . In granting special exemptions, the board shall find the]following:(a) The exemption requested is listed as an allowed specialexemption within the zoning district in which the propertyis located.(b) The use is consistent with the goals, policies, andrecommended future land use of the adopted master plan.(c) The granting of the exemption is in harmony with thegeneral purposes and intent of the ordinance and will notbe injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimentalto the public welfare.[¶26] The parties agree that there are no parking regulations specifically applicable toexisting structures in the R-1 Residence District or to special exemptions in the R-1district. The question, therefore, is whether the board has the power to regulate parkingin order to ameliorate any injurious ramifications of a special exemption. The definitionof ?special exemption? in the Sheridan City Ordinances, which we read in pari materiawith the list of special exemptions, provides an answer to this question.Special Exemption. A special exemption is a certainuse as listed in Sec. 4.1 [the R-1 Residence District] . . . ofthis code which may be harmonious under special conditionsand in specific locations within a zone, but may not beallowed under the general conditions of the zone as stated inthis code. A special exemption must be authorized by theBoard of Adjustment after appropriate findings.Sheridan Zoning Ord. § 2 (revised by Sheridan Ord. No. 1812) (emphasis added). InNorthern Laramie, ¶ 76, 290 P.3d at 1088, we stated that the agency had the power toimpose special conditions on an industrial siting permit because the relevant statutesreferenced such power. The same rationale applies here. Given that the ordinancedefining special exemption refers to special conditions, the Board is entitled to imposeappropriate conditions.[End Page 12][¶27] Parking is undoubtedly something which is within the power of the City Counciland Board of Adjustments to regulate. In fact, there are other provisions of theordinances which specifically address parking requirements. See, e.g., Sheridan ZoningOrd. §§ 10.16; Sheridan Ord. No. 826. It is true that the R-1 Residence District rules donot impose any parking requirements on existing structures. However, the very nature ofa special exemption is to allow a use that technically is not permitted by the generalzoning laws, provided the underlying goals of the zoning ordinances can be met with specific terms of use. In Laramie River Cons. Council v. Industrial Siting Council, 588P.2d 1241, 1255 (Wyo. 1978), we approved the Industrial Siting Council's use ofconditions in a permit as ?an appropriate way to resolve certain areas in which absent such a commitment the [ISC] might be concerned as to the potential for injury to theinhabitants . . .?. Given the ordinances allow special exemptions to be conditioned andparking is within the purview of zoning authorities, we conclude the Board had the powerto impose parking restrictions on the Bernards? bed and breakfast as a condition ofgranting the special exemption.C. Compliance with Requirements for Granting a Special Exemption[¶28] The Tarvers claim the Board erred when it concluded the Bernards? applicationcomplied with the requirements for granting a special exemption. The substantialevidence standard of review applies to the agency's evidentiary determinations after acontested case hearing.When the burdened party prevailed before the agency, wewill determine if substantial evidence exists to support thefinding for that party by considering whether there is relevantevidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind mightaccept in support of the agency's conclusions. . . . If, in thecourse of its decision making process, the agency disregardscertain evidence and explains its reasons for doing so basedupon determinations of credibility or other factors containedin the record, its decision will be sustainable under thesubstantial evidence test. Importantly, our review of anyparticular decision turns not on whether we agree with theoutcome, but on whether the agency could reasonablyconclude as it did, based on all the evidence before it. Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d at 561. The agency's conclusions of law are, of course, subject tode novo review. Id., ¶ 26, 188 P.3d at 561-62.[¶29] As we stated in Paragraph 25, above, the Board must make three findings in orderto grant a special exemption. The first requirement is that the exemption is allowedwithin the zoning district. Sheridan Zoning Ord. § 14.2(a). There is no question this[End Page 13]requirement was satisfied because a bed and breakfast is listed as an allowed specialexemption in the R-1 Residence District. Sheridan Zoning Ord. § 4.1(D).[¶30] The second requisite finding is ?[t]he use is consistent with the goals, policies, andrecommended future land use of the adopted master plan.? Sheridan Zoning Ord. §14.2(b). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-501 et seq. (LexisNexis 2013) directs the planningcommissions of municipalities to adopt master plans for the physical development of themunicipalities. The master plans must include, among other things, zoning plans forregulation of the use of private and public structures. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-503(a)(v)(LexisNexis 2013).[¶31] The City of Sheridan adopted a master plan in 2001 entitled ?Vision 2020Sheridan County Growth Management Plan.? The master plan includes three themes,each of which includes goals and implementation strategies. The three themes are:? Theme 1. Maintain a community character that preservesthe quality of life, values and traditions of the area.? Theme 2. Enable planned growth throughout SheridanCounty.? Theme 3. Initiate guidelines and standards to achievepredictable and consistent land use and development.[¶32] The Tarvers seem to concede that the Board's decision properly found that theBernards? application met Theme 1, and they state in their brief that Theme 3 is notrelevant to this dispute. They claim, however, there is no evidence the Bernards? bed andbreakfast complies with Theme 2 of the master plan. They direct us to Goal B of Theme2, which states:Goal B. Plan for Orderly Commercia[l]DevelopmentBACKGROUNDIt is recognized that as the population of Sheridangrows, additional commercial and industrial locations will berequired. Commercial centers that are compatible with thecharacter of the area are the desired configuration of newcommercial development. . . .The relevant implementation strategies state:[End Page 14]carefully planned and controlled to make the most efficientuse of public street and road improvements and reduceconflicts.[End Page 2.B.4 The encroachment of commercial establishments into]residential areas and the growth of shallow strip commercialdevelopment should be discouraged, while recognizing thatcertain types of commercial uses must be located with goodaccessibility to major highways.The Tarvers argue that because the ?recommended future land use? in the master plandiscourages the encroachment of commercial establishments in residential areas, theBernards? bed and breakfast cannot be allowed in the area zoned as an R-1 ResidenceDistrict.[¶33] The Board responded to the Tarvers? argument in its order:[End Page 5. In arguing that a bed and breakfast is inconsistent with]the master plan, the Tarvers[] argue that the master planprovides in relevant part that ?The encroachment ofcommercial establishments into residential areas . . . shouldbe discouraged? and that the Bernards? bed and breakfast isby definition ?commercial development? because it is abuilding where services are delivered. The Board believesdifferently.The master plan only provides that encroachment ofcommercial establishments should be ?discouraged,? notrestricted or completely limited. By virtue of the fact that theordinances allow limited exemptions to R-1 ResidentialDistrict neighborhoods, the Board can only conclude thatwhile commercial development in an R-1 area is discouraged,it is not [altogether] restricted and should be allowed incertain limited exceptions. It is also notable that, of theallowed exemptions in an R-1 Residential District (i.e. funeralhome or mortuary, hospitals, sanitarium, or clinic, notincluding animal hospital, home for the children or aged,offices . . . offering professional services), a bed and breakfastis arguably the least commercial.[End Page 15][¶34] Bed and breakfast is defined in the Sheridan ordinances as ?[a] service ofproviding lodging with breakfast in exchange for payment in a residential dwelling.? Abed and breakfast is unquestionably ?commercial development? as that term is broadlydefined in the master plan as ?all land and buildings where products, goods, or servicesare delivered or rendered.?[¶35] As the Tarvers point out, the master plan states that commercial development in R-1 areas is discouraged. It does not, however, state that it is prohibited. Considering theordinances as a whole and in harmony with one another as required by our statutoryinterpretation jurisprudence, it is clear the governing body did not intend to completelyban bed and breakfasts in residential areas. The ordinances would not have listed bed andbreakfast as an allowed special exemption in the R-1 Residence District if it wasprohibited. Moreover, the very definition of a bed and breakfast as ?lodging? within a?residential dwelling? implies that it will be a type of commercial establishment locatedwithin a residential zoning district. The Tarvers? interpretation of the master plan?sdiscouragement of commercial development in residential areas would convert the word?discourage? into ?prohibit.? That clearly was not the intent of the governing body whenit provided a specific process for approval of bed and breakfasts in the R-1 ResidenceDistrict.[¶36] Robert Briggs, the planning director for the City of Sheridan, testified at thecontested case hearing about how restricted commercial development may be allowedwithin an R-1 district while remaining consistent with the master plan:Q. And is it correct to say that Vision 2020 is not azoning document?A. It is not a zoning document. It is a policy planwhich makes recommendations regarding land use anddevelopment. It's a zoning document in the sense that, as allland use and master plans have a connection to the City?sadopted zoning ordinance, that it should ? that they should beconsistent with each other and inform each other. The masterplan is intended to create the philosophical basis or thecommunity's ? a reflection of the community and what they?dlike to see expressed in the zoning ordinance.Q. So I misspoke. Probably the more pointedquestion would be, it has no enforceable regulation in Vision[End Page 2020. Is that correct?]A. To my ? no. It's a policy document ofrecommendations. And there are elements of the code which[End Page 16]require consistency with the plan. But in and of itself, it isnot a regulatory document.Q. Have you been to the Bernards? home, the subject of this application?A. I have.....Q. Aside from the site visit, you reviewed theVision 2020 plan in conjunction with this application. Is thattrue?A. That's correct.Q. What other materials did you review? Did youreview the application . . . ?A. I did.Q. What other materials did you review in formingyour analysis of the special exemption application?A. I reviewed municipal code, in particular, the sections relating to R-1 zoning, the Board of Adjustments?approval of special exemptions and the definitions portion ofthe zoning ordinance. I also referenced professionaldocuments . . .....Q. And as to Requirement Number 2, which we?vediscussed, the use is consistent with goals, policies andrecommended future land use as adopted in Vision 2020,what was your analysis of this application for exemption inconjunction with your review of Vision 2020?A. Reviewing a special exemption in considerationwith this particular clause of City code is interesting in that special exemptions are actually conditional uses. So you willnever find in an adopted plan ? or, I would say it would beextremely rare to find in an adopted plan something thatactually calls out an area, in particular for a specific special[End Page 17]exemption. And so my purpose in reviewing this section wasto review the goals and objectives of that plan which arepertinent and also to look at -- Vision 2020 does not containa future land use map, per se. What it does is it contains aninventory of existing land uses, and then those policy goalsand recommendations revolve around development withinthose existing land use categories.So I first conducted a review of the various goals andobjectives and settled on the most relevant, at least in mymind, goal of that plan, which was to ensure the compatibilityof new development and redevelopment with communityvalues and existing development. And in looking at that,what I first did ? what I did is recognizing that, by virtue ofbeing listed as an allowed use in an R-1 zoning district, thatmeant that, at least in the mind of the crafters of our zoningordinance, that a bed and breakfast, if operated properly, it?spossible for that to be a use which is in harmony with theexisting uses of an R-1 neighborhood.And so that was kind of, I think, the general thrust ofwhat I homed in on in terms of comparing it to the Vision[End Page 2020 plan.]Q. And so, essentially, it's allowed as anexemption in the zoning, and thus, you believe it wascompatible with the zoning to have a bed and breakfast,compatible with the Vision 2020?A. That's correct.[¶37] Mr. Briggs noted the master plan did not include a future use map, but histestimony demonstrated that the city officials weighed the policies for community growth set forth in the master plan with the requested special exemption, keeping in mind that theuse as a bed and breakfast would be outside the typical uses within the R-1 zoningdistrict. He explained how the special exemption criteria worked together to ensure thatany non-conforming use would not be detrimental to the neighborhood. Although he didnot use the precise language of Theme 2 of the master plan, there is no question that hetook into account the general discouragement of commercial development in residentialareas.[¶38] Recognizing that commercial development is out of the ordinary in residentialareas, Mr. Briggs addressed the parking issues for the Bernards? bed and breakfast to[End Page 18]bring it into compliance with the third special exemption criterion, i.e. that it not beinjurious to the neighborhood. The Bernards were agreeable to entering into restrictivecovenants governing parking for their property, and the Board conditioned the specialexemption upon the recording of appropriate restrictions.[¶39] The Tarvers also expressed concern that allowing the Bernards a specialexemption for a bed and breakfast would lead to ?creeping commercialism? because theBoard would not be able to deny future requests for bed and breakfast establishments or similar special exemptions. The Board addressed this argument as follows:[End Page 14. The Tarvers have argued that granting the]Bernards? application for a special exemption will create aprecedent for other commercial establishments to move intothe R-1 Residential District where the Bernards? residence islocated. This testimony is speculative and unsupported byany evidence contained in the record before this Board. TheBoard has discretion to grant or deny applications for specialexemptions and will do so on a case-by-case basis given themerits of each application as they relate to the requirementsfor granting special exemptions. By granting the Bernards?application, the Board is in no way bound to grant futureapplications for a special exemption.[¶40] Each application must meet all of the requirements set out in the ordinances forgranting a special exemption. As we stated earlier, the Board has discretion in granting special exemptions. See Epp, 894 P.2d at 596. In conducting its discretionary analysis,the Board may find that the fact a special exemption has already been granted in aneighborhood weighs in favor of or against future applications for special exemptions.The Tarvers have not demonstrated how allowing one special exemption would changethe nature of their neighborhood, leading to an influx of other nonconforming uses. Inaddition, Mr. Bernard testified about the efforts they had made to keep the commercialnature of their enterprise discrete, including inconspicuous signage, landscaping typicalof the rest of the neighborhood, etc.[¶41] We conclude the record contains relevant evidence which a reasonable mind mightaccept in support of the Board's determination that the Bernards? use of their property asa bed and breakfast met the standards set out in the relevant statutes and city ordinances.The Board's finding that the Bernards? bed and breakfast, with the parking restrictions,was consistent with the City's master plan is in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence. The Board properly applied its discretion in concluding theBernards were entitled to a special exemption, and we will not interfere with thatdecision.[End Page 19][¶42] Affirmed.[End Page 20]